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The Roles of the State and the Market
in Establishing Property Rights
Andrzej Rapaczynski
I t is an old saw of the economics profession that markets require a clear as-signment of initial entitlements to most resources and well-enforced rules ofcontract. Governments intent on fostering a market economy should thus
make sure to put an effective legal system in place, one in which property rights
are unambiguous, secure and freely alienable. Even if the state gets some of the
initial entitlements wrong, it is often added, the Coase theorem instructs us that
the parties, if free to contract, will correct this by appropriate private agreements.
The experience of postcommunist countries in eastern Europe is a good re-
minder that economists tend to assume a can opener when one is needed. Indeed,
the statement that property and contract rights must be "put in place" assumes
away one of the most interesting and intricate questions concerning economic de-
velopment. The creation of a system of enforceable entitlements to the diverse and
complex forms of wealth characteristic of a modern society is itself a process subject
to economic laws; as I shall argue here, it is in fact largely a product of market
forces, rather than governmental fiat.
Does the Market Presuppose a Property Rights Regime?
A legal regime—or, indeed, the political system that supports it—is not an
independent structure that undergirds the economic system; instead, it is embed-
ded in the economic order at the same time as that order cannot exist without it.
• Andrzej Rapaczynski is Professor of Law, Columbia University, New York City, New York,
and Director of the Privatization Project, Central European University, Budapest, Hungary.
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This is true not only in democracies, in which economic power is always felt in the
political process and has an impact on legislation, but also in authoritarian regimes,
which need something more than force to maintain themselves. Consequently, the
legal-regulatory activity of any government does not follow some abstract and pre-
determined rules (such as economists customarily propose for the mysteriously
omnipotent "benevolent dictators"), but is basically reactive to the situation in the
market, both in terms of the content of the regulations and the process by which
they are promulgated. The market determines the strength of the various interest
groups that formulate their plans for governmental regulation, including the es-
tablishment of property rights, and that regulation in turn modifies the forces of
the market and the relative strength of the interest groups. The development of
the legal-regulatory system, much as the development of other economic institu-
tions, is not an outcome of a fully rational choice of "optimal" solutions, but rather
a gradual, incremental and evolutionary process. Moreover, to the extent that the
process through which economic forces shape the legal system is itself a form of
competitive and evolutionary mechanism, it reveals a number of similarities to the
market and should be analyzed with the help of some of the same tools as those
used to explain economic phenomena. This political economy of property rights is
all too often neglected in the economic discussions of the problems of transition.
But even apart from any political constraints on economic legislation, the no-
tion that simply instituting an appropriate legal regime will establish a set of prop-
erty rights that can undergird a modern economic system is deeply implausible,
because most property rights can be only marginally enforced by the legal system.
The core of the institution of ownership is a matter of unquestioned and largely
unconscious social and economic practices that must be rooted in nonlegal devel-
opments. This is the old Hobbesian problem: When most people obey the law, the
government can enforce it effectively and (relatively) cheaply against the few in-
dividuals who break it. But when obedience breaks down on large enough scale,
no authority is strong enough to police everyone. In such a setting, with enforce-
ment becoming less and less effective, individuals have an incentive to follow their
own interests, regardless of any paper constraints.
In answer to this Hobbesian problem, it is often said that respect for the law
presupposes a set of cultural beliefs that make most people, even in the absence of
a realistic threat of sanctions, deviate from purely self-interested behavior in favor
of other norms, more conducive to the interest of the community. Such norms may
be provided by morality and custom or—as Hobbes believed—they may be initially
irrational from an individual point of view, but nevertheless collectively beneficial
and result in an enforceable system of legal norms: if most people, for whatever
reason, come to believe that the government is able to enforce the law (perhaps,
for example, because it is believed to be divinely sanctioned), that very belief makes
the sovereign in fact capable of making sure that its commands are obeyed.1
1For an interpretation of Hobbes along these lines, see Rapaczynski (1987).
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I do not mean to deny that a culture of respect for property rights is very helpful
in making property rights effective. But virtue is itself a rather scarce commodity,
and a system of habits and beliefs alone may be too flimsy a foundation for the
multitude of complex and innovative behavioral patterns necessary to sustain a
modern economy. An effective legal system requires a more solid support. This
means that most property-related arrangements in an advanced economy must in-
volve various self-enforcing mechanisms ingrained in the incentive structure of spon-
taneous economic behavior, so that moral virtue and the legal system are necessary
to deal with only a thin layer of aberrational occurrences. The reason why most
people perform their contractual obligations, for example, is not that they are afraid
of remorse or state coercion, but that in the extended context in which they are
expected to conduct their business, a breach would be against their best interests.
However, the self-enforcing mechanisms on which compliance depends in the over-
whelming majority of cases are themselves institutions produced by the market, not
a set of rules that can be laid in advance.
Moreover, property rights in a modern society are too complex to be "put in
place" in advance of the development of a market economy. To be sure, some very
basic entitlements, such as one's right to personal property, a home, chattels, and
so on, are not difficult to define, although the phenomenal rise in crime against
persons and property in some eastern European countries shows that their protec-
tion may sometimes collapse in times of transition. But the simple entitlements to
physical objects are only a small part of the property rights characteristic of a mod-
ern economy.2 Consider the assets held by an average American. The only signifi-
cant tangible thing that person is likely to own is a house; the rest of the wealth
probably consists in various rights to future income streams, such as a pension,
return on shares in a mutual fund, expectations of support from Social Security or
Medicare, or benefits of a status granted by the state (like a license to practice law
or conduct business). When one looks at the more "propertied classes" of modern
America, the intangibles become ever more prevalent and ever more esoteric: pat-
ents, futures, financial derivatives, tax shelters, mortgage-backed securities, junk
bonds and instruments that only a few wizards understand.
The problem with most of these sophisticated forms of property is that the law
of even the most powerful, rational and benevolent states cannot fully define or
protect them. This does not mean that the law does not play a very important role
in their definition and enforcement—the thousands of volumes of corporate and
securities laws, administrative law, court decisions, and agency rules and regulations
do just that. But the law must work here with other mechanisms, because the ben-
efits to be derived from the complex forms of property crucially depend on good-
faith cooperation among a number of parties and on additional enforcement mech-
anisms that are necessarily more flexible than any legal rules. As in marriage, in
2For a view that "physical" control rights over productive assets play a significant role in eastern Europe,
see Shleifer (1995). Clearly, the view expressed here runs against this idea.
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which the law also has a deep interest, but where legal definition and enforcement
of such matters as who cleans the dishes, who takes care of the children and how
often the other spouse visits the mother-in-law would destroy the fabric of the re-
lation, so in many economic contexts, the rights of various parties make sense only
against an institutional background structured by nonlegal interactions.
Consider, for example, the institution of minority rights in a modern corpo-
ration.3 These rights are not a straightforward form of ownership. In fact, they are
a rather delicate product of a peculiar institutional configuration and a special form
of financing. A minority shareholder provides often substantial funds and receives
in exchange neither a firm commitment to a specified form of repayment (such as
that promised to an ordinary creditor) nor any significant control rights. Instead,
this shareholder relies on the controlling stakeholders and the management to
conduct the business of the corporation in such a way as both to maximize its value
and to share the upside potential with the passive investor.
To be sure, every legal system provides some protection of minority sharehold-
ers and puts certain fiduciary obligations on the majority. But like divorce in a
marriage, these are, of necessity, effective only in the most extreme situations. The
legal system cannot, in the name of protecting the minority, tie the hands of the
majority and its management team in the exercise of their best business judgment;
indeed, the whole institution of minority shareholding relies on the ability of an
investor to "piggyback" on the often ineffable skills and efforts of the controlling
parties, without a need to look over their shoulders and second-guess important
business decisions. An effort to subject these decisions to a set of legal rules would
be like prescribing the number of visits that a husband must pay his mother-in-law:
it would eviscerate the benefits of the whole relation. Thus, the institution of mi-
nority shareholding cannot rest primarily on the ability of such investors to vindicate
their rights through the legal system. Instead, it must fundamentally rest on the
confidence of investors in the fact that, in an overwhelming majority of cases, the
majority will honor its commitments to the minority, without any individual mon-
itoring or a threat of legal sanctions.
We have noted already that the investor's confidence is not likely to be based
primarily on his reliance on the force of moral norms as a guide to the actions of
the majority. Much as the expectations of a spouse are often backed by more than
conjugal love, the investor's confidence is backed by a self-enforcing system of the
market. The basis of all the incentives and expectations responsible for the confi-
dence level necessary for a viable institution of minority shareholding is the fact
that most companies must come back to the market for more financing. If a firm
does not make a credible commitment to outside investors or casts doubt on their
right to participate in the income streams produced by the firm, the firm's access
to capital markets will be closed, and it will not be able to generate capital in the
3The point made here concerning minority rights is based on Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994,
pp. 179ff).
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future. But the connection between a firm's failure to commit to minority investors'
rights and the severing of its access to finance is not a simple matter, and it is
precisely its complexity and specificity that makes it unsuitable for legal definition
and enforcement.
To begin with, breaches of faith to minority investors are not a clear-cut issue;
whether a minority investor is receiving sufficient returns, given the firm's perfor-
mance, general market conditions, the balance between short-term income and
long-term appreciation, and so on, is a rather murky question in most cases. The
market must assimilate this ambiguous information, analyze and disseminate it, and
produce a spontaneous response from a great number of prospective investors in
the future, so that parties abusing minority rights will indeed have difficulties with
access to new funds. It is this complex institutional framework of a market economy
that constitutes, in large part, the background regime necessary to support modern
forms of private property, which, consequently, cannot be ' 'put in place" in advance
of its creation.
I should add that the institution of majority investment in a modern corporation
is not very much less complex and dependent on a number of background condi-
tions. The controlling investor in a modern corporation is usually also incapable of
enforcing his rights directly, as against such other stakeholders as workers, man-
agement and the state. In fact, even a majority shareholder is quite removed from
any simple "physical" control of the corporate assets.
The Special Case of Eastern Europe
In the early stages of a market economy, there is little need for many of the
more sophisticated forms of entitlements. Instead, the market develops coexten-
sively with its legal system, so that the necessary background institutions come about
gradually together with refinements in the legal structure and the state enforcement
mechanisms. The peculiar problem of eastern Europe is that the state of its capital
stock by far exceeds the development of its institutional environment. The rapid
industrialization during the communist period produced an enormous concentra-
tion of assets in an organizational form that was largely dysfunctional, both in terms
of internal governance structure and in terms of the interfirm coordination mech-
anisms necessary for a successful economy. The reform movement in eastern Eu-
rope thus cannot proceed by laying down a few simple rules and waiting for evo-
lutionary growth to do the rest. Instead, if most of the assets controlled by the state
are not to be wasted, an advanced form of a market economy, together with its
complex institutions, must be created in an unusually short period of time.
The problems generated by this condition are not limited to the well-travelled
political and logistical difficulties of effecting an asset transfer of unprecedented
proportions. What makes this transfer particularly difficult is the fact that a system
of property rights sufficient to support viable entitlements to the kinds of assets
being transferred does not exist and cannot be created overnight. A successful
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reallocation and restructuring of the former state assets requires that they be put
in a new organizational configuration, which already presupposes the complex
types of entitlements characteristic of the advanced market economies, and yet
those types of entitlements are to be established for the first time by the asset
transfer itself. Consequently, the background necessary for the transfer may be
missing or incomplete, and the state, even when it genuinely intends to divest itself
of the resources it controls, might fail to convey them effectively to other parties
(Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994, pp. 188–89).
This unique situation of eastern Europe makes the question of how property
rights are created of particular importance in the region. If establishing property
entitlements is primarily a matter of legislation and state enforcement, then the
reconstruction of the state is a task of extreme urgency on which the whole reform
effort is likely to depend.4 If, on the other hand, the establishment of viable property
rights characteristic of a modern economy is as much an outcome of the develop-
ment of market institutions as of any government's legislative and enforcement
activity, then certain economic measures undertaken by the government may con-
tribute more to the establishment of viable property rights than volumes of new
codes and legions of new judges and policemen.
For example, if my discussion of the prerequisites for a viable system of prop-
erty rights of minority shareholders is correct, the introduction of hard budget
constraints for enterprises—thus forcing them to go to the market for any addi-
tional capital—may do more for the development of effective property rights of
minority shareholders than investing heavily in the regulatory and enforcement
capacities of a securities and exchange commission. The same hard budget con-
straints may ultimately do more for the protection of creditors than most bank-
ruptcy laws.
A related problem of particular concern in eastern Europe, though surely not
unique to the region, is that the state itself is often the most significant threat to
the security of property rights. Indeed, the role of the state in securing property
rights from encroachments by third parties is probably much less significant than
its ability to precommit credibly to respect these rights itself.
The state can go wrong in this area in several ways. The first possibility, most
often noted but perhaps not the most important, is that rights that are clearly
granted will be revoked in the future. Most states, including all eastern European
ones, provide some constitutional and legislative guarantees against such takings,
and although the relevant legal provisions are usually quite fuzzy at the edges,
outright confiscations are in fact relatively rare.
But the fuzziness of the takings law is not accidental. Every state routinely
engages in various kinds of taxation and regulation that impair the value of people's
investments, and most of such encroachments are not considered compensable
4For an argument that this strategy is not likely to succeed in the short run, see, for example, Shleifer
(1995).
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takings. Despite the refinements of takings jurisprudence in many countries, the
transaction costs of most compensatory procedures are so high that only the most
egregious kinds of encroachments can be subject to legal control. More gradual or
surreptitious encroachments on property interests can result in no less cumulative
impairment than the "outright" takings. And yet the law, at least property law,
usually provides no remedies for these types of infringements.
What does provide some degree of protection in this respect is the political
system, together with the economic pressure groups that ensure that the state does
not go "too far" in interfering with the owner's control over assets. This politically
determined thin line may be understood as the real definition of property rights
conferred by the state, as distinct from the somewhat fictitious legal notion of prop-
erty rights. How broadly property rights are defined in this real sense and how
effective state's (largely nonlegal) commitment is to their security is a more serious
problem than the issue of legal protections against the more traditional form of
takings. But precisely because these commitments are not of a legal nature, but
rather inhere in the structure and practices of political institutions, they are difficult
to put into place in a short time. In fact, without a significant historical record of
state forbearance from excessive and redistributive regulation, it is hard to make
the state's commitment credible.
The threat posed by the state to the security of broadly defined property rights
is particularly severe when the state also happens to own a significant proportion
of national assets—something that characterizes all of the states in eastern Europe.
A state that conducts much of its policy through the exercise of its ownership rights
(which leave a lot of discretion to the decision maker) tends to neglect the devel-
opment of its regulatory capacities (where a certain degree of transparency and
procedural regularity is required) and thus increases the degree of arbitrariness in
the pursuit of its economic policies. Often, such a state uses subsidies, regulatory
redistribution and various rigidities to protect its own inefficient state sector. Finally,
because the states of eastern Europe hold a near monopoly in certain areas of
ownership—commercial real estate, for example—they can de facto restrict the
types of interests that other parties may hold in assets of a given type, even if formally
the rights of ownership are unrestricted and broadly defined.5
The East German Exception
Every rule has its exceptions, and East Germany is a glaring example of a
situation in which a complete legal order was put in place at the very beginning of
the transition. In fact, the whole machinery of the West German state had been
transplanted to the former GDR, including its constitution, legislation, regulatory
5 I will discuss the case of real estate below. For a discussion of the effects of state ownership on the
nonstate sector, see Pistor and Turkewitz (1996).
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regime, judicial system, police, and so on. But East Germany was indeed a very
special case. The reform process was imported wholesale from outside, with no
human capital limitations (West Germany providing a nearly inexhaustible source
of qualified managers, judges and state administrators) and at a cost of some $100
billion a year for a number of years. Suffice it to say that at this rate, five years of
reform in Russia would require an influx of some $4 trillion (!) and that the per
capita subsidy to East German citizens was alone over twice as large as the per capita
GDP in the rest of eastern Europe. As a result, it is very doubtful whether the East
German case provides any analogies with or lessons for the rest of the region, and
I will ignore it in the rest of this paper.
The Experience of Eastern Europe with Property Rights
Property Rights in the New Private Sector
The most dynamically growing part of the eastern European economies is the
new private sector: a multitude of stores, service outlets, trading companies, small
manufacturing operations, and so on. Most of these businesses are unincorporated;
those that operate in company form usually employ just a few workers, often other
family members. To what extent is this development related to the establishment
of secure property rights and what type of rights play an important role?
The first observation is that the more complex types of entitlements discussed
above play nearly no role in the rise of small business. Although a small minority
of them operate in a corporate form, they are de facto owned by a single individual
or a very small group of people who do not in any significant way rely on corporate
and securities laws: they do not raise capital from the public, their shares do not
trade, and corporate procedures are complied with in the most minimalistic of
fashions. Debt capital also plays an insignificant role—perhaps a loan from a family
member or a friend, at most some working capital loan from a bank. Except for
rights to real estate, which will be discussed presently, the operation of these busi-
nesses requires minimal support in the form of state protection of their property
rights. Indeed, the most important contribution of the legal system to their
growth was the elimination of obstacles that the state itself had been putting in
their path in the form of a panoply of restrictions on registration, employment,
operations, access to foreign currency, confiscatory taxation, and so on. Even in
these areas many obstacles remain. Taxes, especially payroll taxes that often
reach 40–50 percent, are very burdensome in all countries, registration of a com-
pany is difficult and costly in many, and prices (especially of real estate and energy)
are often controlled.
The Role of Contract Enforcement
Most eastern European states have upgraded their legal systems to provide
more protection for businesses. New civil and commercial codes were enacted or,
as in Poland, prewar legislation was put back in force. Although the provisions of
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these codes are usually quite broad (and sometimes antiquated) and they lack the
necessary judicial and scholarly elaboration, they are probably sufficient for the
enforcement of simple contract rights. Little was done to modernize the court
system, but the private bar was reestablished, providing for the possibility of effective
legal assistance. A number of private arbitrage tribunals have been created to fa-
cilitate resolution of business disputes.
In the light of such changes, it is surprising that the demand for legal services
seems to have dropped precipitously in some countries and risen less than one
might have expected in others. The available data is so far very limited. That col-
lected for Russia shows that between the first half of 1993 and 1994 alone, the
number of economic disputes in the Arbitrazh Court (despite the name, actually
not an arbitrage tribunal, but an ordinary commercial court) fell by 30 percent,
and the 1993 figure had already been much smaller than the number of disputes
prior to 1991. The private arbitrage tribunals have been practically unused. And all
this has been happening at the time when the number of existing businesses and,
presumably, also business transactions, has increased dramatically and when gal-
loping inflation and a disruption of preexisting business routines could have been
expected to result in a dramatic increase in the number of disputes. In other coun-
tries the number of cases went up, most notably in Poland, but after an initial spurt
stabilized at about twice the level of 1989. Given that the number of legal entities
in Poland trebled (to over 33,000) during the same period and over one million
individual entrepreneurs entered the market, the rise is actually quite small. As a
result, although much contract law has been enacted and some institutions created,
the impact of these changes does not seem to be very significant.6
This strange development has many potential causes. It is possible that business
people, especially private entrepreneurs, lack confidence in judicial institutions
traceable to the old regime and that courts in such countries as Poland are over-
burdened. It is also likely that many small businesses, especially in Russia, operate
on the borderlines of legality, avoiding taxes, siphoning revenues from state enter-
prises, or engaging in illegal arbitrage transactions. The fear that contracts con-
cerning these transactions would be either unenforceable or, even worse, expose
them to prosecution, might make them unwilling to use the courts. Recourse to
unofficial dispute resolution and enforcement mechanisms, such as organized
crime, may also dampen demand for court services.7
But still, the drop in demand for legal services in the fastest-growing area of
the new market economies is a striking reminder that the economists' insistence
6For more detailed figures concerning the fall in demand for legal services in Russia and a discussion
of possible causes, see Pistor (1996). For figures on Poland, see Pistor (1995). It would be interesting to
know whether the initial increase in the number of disputes was due to the disruption of routines among
state enterprises or to an influx of new private actors, but the data are not available.
7For an account assuming that many Russian businesses use organized crime for dispute resolutions and
providing proposals for improvements in the judicial system that might change this preference, see Hay,
Shleifer and Vishny (1996).
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on clear enforcement of property rights and contracts as a prerequisite to a func-
tioning market may be putting the cart before the horse.8 To be sure, it is likely
that the greater inefficiency of the legal system in Russia, as compared to, say,
Poland or the Czech Republic, is also responsible for a slower rate of growth of
Russia's private sector. But the dynamic growth of the private sector in all the coun-
tries of eastern Europe in which certain minimal macroeconomic reforms were put
in place is an indication that economic policy changes have a much more direct
impact on growth than the reforms of the legal system.
The falling demand for legal services in eastern Europe offers some support
for the hypothesis that a relatively simple market economy does not need much in
terms of judicially enforced property rights; some simple homegrown mechanisms
will suffice. The growth of business transactions mainly involves smaller exchanges,
where the transaction costs of recourse to courts are probably too high, given the
stakes involved.9 Many customers are likely to be repeat players, so that a refusal to
deal with someone in the future is a more effective remedy than a formal lawsuit.
Instead of relying on judicial enforcement, as under the old regime, many creditors
are now requiring collateral.10 To be sure, some transactions must not be taking
place because of the unavailability of sophisticated enforcement mechanisms,11 but
the open form of contracting among repeat players must also produce substantial
savings.
The Rights to Real Estate
Commercial real estate is the one area related to the growth of the new private
sector where the establishment of new property rights may be quite important, and
where more effective state action might have been quite useful. The reason for this
is that desirable commercial premises are a scarce commodity, and they were nearly
wholly monopolized by the state and semistate cooperatives. Moreover, at the be-
ginning of the reform process, real estate was the most important asset of most
small business establishments. Given the conditions of chronic shortages under
communism, shops, service establishments and other small oudets had no inventory
of any value. Nor did they have any goodwill among their clientele: the gruffness
of the retail salespeople was legendary. Their only asset was the control of valuable
real estate. But despite the insistence on quick privatization of the retail and service
8Theoretically speaking, the fall in demand could also result from the fact that the legal system became
very efficient. A high degree of predictability and smooth enforcement of judicial decisions would, of
course, lead to high levels of settlement prior to litigation. But one thing on which just about everyone
agrees is that the legal systems of eastern Europe are neither predictable nor efficient.
9 I t is also likely that courts were overused under the old regime, since firms hardly cared about legal
costs, while managers may have been in trouble if they did not protect all the property of the enterprise.
10Use of collateral might also require some judicial enforcement. But the burden of proceeding with
the case is often reversed and the enforcement is much simpler.
11Contraction of credit may be cited as one negative effect of weak protection of contracts. But the
general macroeconomic conditions (high inflation and high interest rates) together with the inefficiency
of the banking system, which is incapable of risk assessment under the new conditions, are more likely
culprits. Increased transaction costs of lending to smaller businesses may also play a role in certain sectors.
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sectors in nearly all reforming countries of eastern Europe, little effort went into
the privatization of commercial real estate.
Russia and some other former Soviet Republics have been the most backward
in this respect. Unlike the western rim communist countries, the Soviet Union had
no legal basis for private ownership of land. Thus, at the beginning of the reform
period, all land in Russia formally belonged to the state, with no legal basis of private
ownership in agricultural, commercial, or residential real estate. Moreover, given
the role that collectivization had played in Soviet ideology, and given that the old
peasant class had been either physically wiped out or transformed into a peculiar
form of rural proletariat,12 establishing the principle of private property in land was
extremely controversial. A series of laws attempted to give individuals the right to
some control over farmland, but for quite a long period of time a number of re-
strictions (mostly on alienability) had persisted and true ownership was not legal-
ized (Frydman, Rapaczynski and Earle et al., 1993).
In the area of residential real estate, the situation was equally unpropitious,
since there was practically no demand for private property rights. Indeed, because
housing had been (and largely still continues to be) subsidized to such an extent
that rents could not even cover maintenance, the population has largely perceived
efforts to establish private property in housing as a means for the authorities to
raise the amounts paid by tenants for housing. While extreme housing shortages
persist, housing stocks in the hands of many enterprises and governmental units
have been viewed as liabilities rather than assets. Although a law on turning existing
apartments into a condominium form of ownership finally passed in 1994, it re-
mains a paper creation, since the methodology for its implementation is largely
nonexistent and very few conversions have actually occurred.
The situation with respect to commercial real estate in Russia is even more
complicated. The growth of private business has created a great deal of demand
for commercial premises, but a variety of interest groups are keen to preserve
many elements of the status quo. In Russia, several parties often have different
rights to a particular plot of commercial real estate (Harding, 1995). In partic-
ular, the rights to income from premises are separated from the right of use,
and a third party often has a right to decide about future uses. Moreover, the
law does not allow the various parties to buy the remaining pieces of the property
bundle from the others: for example, a user who derives only small benefits from
the premises cannot legally buy from the government (indeed, often several
different departments of the government), which is the official "owner," the
right to sublet the premises and split the additional rental revenues. Reallocation
of the existing space is thus largely blocked in Russia. Various efforts have been
made to clean up the situation by revising the whole legal framework of urban
land use and giving firm ownership rights to one party, but like most efforts to
12Some historians have argued that the principle of private property in land had never existed among
the peasantry of Russia (Pipes, 1990).
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clean Augean stables in one fell swoop, they have neglected the smaller reforms
(such as making secure and alienable leases possible) and nothing much has
changed on the ground.
The absence of a workable system of legal entitlements has clearly played a
retarding role in the growth of small businesses in Russia. Many new Russian busi-
nesses operate out of kiosks and other temporary structures, while existing real
estate is woefully underutilized. But like most problems relating to property rights,
the problem of creating secure titles to commercial real estate transcends the matter
of legal enactments. Indeed, the western rim countries in transition—such as Hun-
gary, Poland and the Czech Republic—have by and large created a legal basis for
private ownership of land of all kinds. Although this fact has certainly contributed
to the fast growth of the new private sector, the rights actually acquired by most
users of commercial premises have been significantly less complete and more in-
secure than those made possible by the legal system (Earle, Frydman, Rapaczynski
and Turkewitz, 1994).
The reason for this lies primarily in the fact that the government (mostly
local government) has retained close to a monopoly on commercial real estate.13
Given the absence of a real estate market capable of reliably pricing the premises
in the hands of local government (especially in times of high inflation), and
given the unwillingness of local bureaucrats to divest themselves of these valu-
able and often personally enriching sources of power, local governments were
not eager to end their outright ownership. As a result, the various privatization
programs concerning small businesses failed to convey a secure title to the most
important asset of most of these establishments. What was usually conveyed was
a leasehold of very short duration, with uncertain rights of renewal and other
restrictions,14 at mostly below-market rentals. Contrary to what one might ex-
pect, the below-market price was not a function of the very partial interest that
was being conveyed. Instead, the below-market rentals were a further manifes-
tation of the role of local government owners who were concerned about pa-
tronage. Most rentals were made to former employees who could not afford to
pay market rents, and thus became even more beholden to the local officials.
An empirical study of small businesses in three east European countries shows
that the real estate title restrictions had a significant dampening effect on the
amount of postprivatization restructuring (Earle, Frydman, Rapaczynski and
Turkewitz, 1994). Still, the pace of development, at least in Poland, Hungary
and the Czech Republic, has been quite impressive.
13In some countries, such as Poland, the former cooperatives are also significant real estate owners in
some areas and provide some competition to the state sector. In others, such as the Czech Republic,
programs of restitution passed a significant portion of commercial real estate into private hands.
14These restrictions were usually much more burdensome in Russia, where government monopolies
were much more complete, than in the western rim countries. They often included such minute details
as what a store may sell on the premises, prohibitions on employee dismissals, transfer limitations, and
so on. The restrictions in the western rim countries were less severe, and the terms were also usually
much shorter.
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Shareholder Rights to Corporate Property
As noted already, the lack of rights to corporate property does not much affect
the predominantly small firms of the dynamic new private sector. But the issue
matters a great deal with respect to large former state enterprises that need to be
restructured both in terms of their internal operations (technology and gover-
nance) and in terms of their ownership structure. These larger firms are often
unsuited for simple individual ownership. Most of the scholarly attention in this
context has been directed toward devising mechanisms for a transfer of large state
enterprises into private hands. But privatization also poses the problem of estab-
lishing a proper rights background for a successful transfer. Whether privatization
involves a traditional sale or a voucher-type transaction, it remains true that the
enterprise assets must be first put in a form suitable for private ownership. If a share
in the new firm is then to be conveyed to a particular private party (an individual
or another corporation), the party in question must be capable of ownership, and
the rights conveyed must be tolerably clear and secure.
Under the old regime, state firms were operated in a purely administrative
fashion, not much differendy from government departments, and various firms
were subordinated to a large number of specialized ministries. The preliminary step
in the privatization process was thus to transform state enterprises into a standard
corporate form and bring their governance structure in line with that prevalent in
the private sector. This process, together with the appointment of appropriate com-
pany boards, was supposed to introduce the legal concept of state ownership, dis-
tinct from political administration. Already at this stage, eastern European states
have experienced the limitations of legal reforms not backed by an evolutionary
development of background economic institutions. Although the state now received
legal tide, its own institutions have not been sufficiently transformed to exercise its
ownership rights in a comprehensive fashion. In some countries, like Hungary, the
tide is vested in a specialized agency; in others, like Poland, it rests with a ministry;
in still others, like Russia, it is in a fund formally subject to parliamentary control.
The various supervisory bodies are generally rudderless, incapable of genuine mon-
itoring, and the effect of the legal change was often to lessen rather than increase
the states control over its own assets. The main consequence of this has been to
increase immensely the powers of corporate insiders. These insiders, mostly man-
agers, are firmly in control of everyday operations and also the most strategic and
long-term decisions. The rights to a number of important decisions, often concern-
ing privatization, are not clearly assigned at all, thus introducing an element of
uncertainty quite harmful to the business prospects of many firms.
The next step was to privatize; that is, to find appropriate private parties to
whom ownership could be conveyed. However, despite further legal changes, the
rights of private parties to corporate property have also remained incomplete. The
easiest job was to pass a law on corporations, although the quality of these docu-
ments, especially in the absence of judicial elaboration, is generally quite low. Po-
land, for example, simply brought back its prewar commercial code. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, in the light of the great strides made by privatization, until the end of
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1995 Russia had no systematic body of corporate law and managed with a series of
poorly drafted stopgap decrees.
But even if Russia had a better set of laws, it would make little difference. Laws
in Russia have a tendency to remain pieces of paper. Moreover, Russian firms are
dominated by the management and, to a lesser extent, employees (Frydman, Pistor
and Rapaczynski, 1996; Frydman, Rapaczynski and Earle et al., 1993; Boycko, Shlei-
fer and Vishny, 1995), and maximizing the value of the firm is often not the most
important objective of these insiders. Maximizing employment, for example, is
clearly important for the employees. The management is often busy plundering
corporate assets by transferring them to firms of which it owns a greater share, and
much of the corporate game in Russia is about gaining access to subsidized credits
and other rents from the state. All the while, the insiders try to disempower the
minority outside owners by refusing to provide them with access to information,
declining to register share transfers of which they disapprove, packing the board
of directors, violating provisions concerning the conduct of shareholder meetings,
and so on (Frydman, Pistor and Rapaczynski, 1996). The fact that all these practices
also happen to be illegal does not seem to make any difference. Even if the Russian
state were not near collapse, it is questionable whether it could police a system in
which the incentives of the parties are so far out of harmony with the purposes of
the law. More likely, until the sources of soft financing disappear and firms are
forced to finance their operations through the market, no legal system will be able
to enforce the rights of outside owners. And even then, the nongovernmental
market-driven institutions necessary to support an effective legal right to corporate
property will develop only gradually.
The situation of equity owners in the western rim postcommunist countries is
superficially better, but with the possible exception of the Czech Republic, they are
also far from having successfully established a new system of corporate property
rights. Poland, for example, has so far failed to privatize the overwhelming majority
of its large industrial enterprises; the state has lacked the power to make private
ownership the rule rather than an exception. Hungary has standard property rights
on the books, but perhaps the most confusing and fragmented ownership structure
in the world. Here, because the state was never able to regain its own full ownership
rights to the nominally state property, it was never really able to transfer those rights
to new owners. As a result, managers of former state firms used this vacuum to
perpetuate their control through a series of cross-ownerships, joint ventures, pyra-
mids of holding companies, legal entities created solely to hold debts or liabilities,
and other structures so arcane as to leave much of the productive assets in Hungary
with no conventional owners at all (Stark, 1996).
The Czech Republic may have been the most successful so far in giving real
existence to corporate property rights. Its legislation and legal infrastructure differ
little from Poland or Hungary. But the Czech authorities have consistently pursued
policies to create the market institutions supporting the effectiveness of modern
property rights. In particular, they opted for a mass privatization program that not
only conferred paper tides on millions of private parties, but also created an incen-
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tive for the development of new and powerful forces demanding the effectuation
of their formal entitlements. This demand, in turn, created not only a political
constituency for governmental restraint and further legal refinements, but also an
incentive for private parties to come up with alternative means of securing the
initially shaky entitlements.
Two features of the Czech mass privatization plan have been particularly im-
portant. The first was a broad giveaway of vouchers exchangeable for the shares of
privatized enterprises to millions of individual citizens, regardless of their status as
insiders or outsiders of any firm. The second was the possibility of depositing one's
vouchers with an investment fund that would then acquire shares of privatized
enterprises and act as their legal owner, with the voucher depositors becoming
owners of the shares of the fund itself. Since opening an investment fund promised
to be lucrative, many such funds were created and they became a powerful lobby
for the interests of shareholders not otherwise related to the corporation. Many
foreign financial institutions joined with Czech partners in forming investment
funds, thus importing many institutional features of the more advanced market
economies. The value to the funds of their reputation gave small investors a realistic
chance of piggybacking on the large players' efforts to monitor the performance
of many Czech firms, and this contributed more than anything else to the estab-
lishment of property rights of minority shareholders.
But even in the Czech Republic it is too early to say whether these rights are
genuinely secure. After the completion of the two "waves" of mass privatization,
the main source of future capital for the funds is not the small voucher holders,
but large foreign and domestic investors. Consequendy, the funds' incentives to
protect their small shareholders are much less strong. It is possible that new legis-
lation protecting minority investors (for which there is considerable pressure) may
now be desirable. But it is also possible that in the absence of a sufficiently strong
background of market-based self-enforcement mechanisms, new legislation will do
more to blunt the dynamism of the new governance structures and further
strengthen the role of state intervention than to guarantee the security of real
income streams to small investors. Indeed, the very high level of state ownership
among the banks controlling the largest funds is already a troubling factor.
Creditors' Rights
The protection of creditors' rights, especially vis-à-vis corporate debtors, is
perhaps the most notable case of how a legal regime cannot work without the
backing of an appropriate institutional framework. Most eastern European coun-
tries have spent considerable energy in preparing and passing elaborate bank-
ruptcy laws. (Poland, again, resorted to bringing back its rather antiquated pre-
war legislation.) However, except for Hungary, no country in eastern Europe
actually sees a significant number of bankruptcies, even though by all accounts
a large number of big firms are chronically in the red. Even in Hungary, it is
doubtful whether the number of bankruptcies indicates that the legislation has
achieved its original purpose. Most firms declaring insolvency do so on their
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own motions, rather than because of creditors' petitions. Often the reason be-
hind this is that the assets of a bankrupt company may be sold by the court, thus
allowing for the management and its allies to go through a privatization without
the supervision of the State Property Agency, which must otherwise approve all
privatization transactions.
Although bankruptcy is often billed as the ultimate creditor's remedy, its
role is predicated on a very small number of firms actually going under. The
system is very costly, and only has the capacity to process a small number of
cases. Even in those, it is doubtful that the courts are really able to bring about
a decent reallocation (or reorganization) of the firm's assets. Bankruptcy is thus
likely to be mainly a threat, used to terrify inefficient managers. But even this
effect is absent when the threat of bringing most debtors down is not credible,
because closing a large number of big firms is politically unacceptable and eco-
nomically wasteful.
Creditors' rights in an economy in transition are unlikely to be well protected
by a threat of bankruptcy. More probable is a scenario in which credit is genuinely
scarce for an extended period of time and firms have strong incentives to invest in
their reputation as creditworthy debtors.15 This involves developing long-standing
relations with their creditors, but also providing demand for such services as ratings,
instruments allowing risk diversification, and so on. Only when these market re-
sponses produce a high enough level of voluntary compliance with debt obligations
will the state judicial intervention become a significant factor in enhancing their
effectiveness.
Conclusion
The absence of well-defined and secure property rights in eastern Europe
clearly contributes to a slower rate of transition. But the effect of the absence of
these rights is not uniform throughout the economy; the new private sector is least
hampered by imperfect definition and enforcement. Progress in the development
of a functioning system of entitlements, especially with respect to the more complex
types of assets in the economy, cannot be expected to come primarily from the
perfection of the legal system. Instead, contrary to the common economists' as-
sumption that a system of property rights is a precondition of a market economy,
the development of market institutions is often a prerequisite for a viable private
property regime. Property rights, like most other goods, are produced in response
to market demand. Although the state may satisfy a portion of this demand, market
responses often come first and provide more effective solutions. Indeed, the legal
responses are often only effective against a background of self-enforcing market
mechanisms.
15Although credit has been tightened in many transition economies, the progress of genuine banking
reform, which is necessary if firms are ever to face a truly hard budget constraint, has been slow.
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